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AFTERWORD—INCREASING GENDER
DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS: IT’S
GONNA BE A LONG WAR1
Harry S. Gerla2

In reading the submissions to this symposium, and in listening to the
presentations that gave rise to most of them, two points stood out. First, a
tremendous disparity exists between the pool of women who are qualified to
sit on corporate boards of directors and the number of women who sit on
those boards. As Mildred Woryk put it, “[w]orldwide, the number of
women on corporate boards is disproportionately low when compared to
their representation in the workplace. In countries without legislation
enforcing quotas, the rate of increase in women’s board representation has
been quite slow.”3 Professor Black succinctly summarizes the dismal
numbers and slow pace of change in her contribution.4 Moreover, as Ms.
Woryk notes, this phenomenon is not confined to the United States, but
appears to be worldwide, at least outside the confines of the Scandinavian
countries.5
Second, no shortage of ideas exists for increasing the representation
of women on corporate boards. Some of these ideas, such as the claim that
it makes good business sense to have gender-diversified boards, and the
increasing availability of openings and qualified women candidates to fill
them because of various demographic trends, seem to suggest that, even
without conscious action, the representation of women on boards of
directors will increase (albeit inadequately and too slowly). Other ideas,
such as more aggressively enforcing already mandated disclosure for
business efforts to enhance gender diversity on boards of directors, setting
quotas for women directors, and broadening the criteria managers and
directors use in nominating candidates for membership on the board, require
conscious action on the part of governmental entities and private firms.
1
The subtitle of this article is derived from the last line of the 1979 Steven Spielberg comic film
1941. Historical character Major General Joseph W. Stillwell (played by Robert Stack) responds to the
assertion by fictional character Sergeant Frank Tree (played by Dan Ackroyd) that “You know, this year
wasn’t the big year of the war, ‘41. I think the really big year is going to be 1942.” Stillwell sighs and
says “It’s gonna be a long war.” Internet Movie Database, 1941, available at http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0078723/quotes.
2
Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law.
3
Mildred Woryk, Women in Corporate Governance: A Cinderella Story, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV.
21, 21 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
4
See Barbara Black, Stalled: Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 7
(2011).
5
Woryk, supra note 3, at 22–24.
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To these two points, I would like to add a third one. The various
trends and actions are either infeasible in the United States, or will have, at
best, a slow and marginal effect in increasing the representation of women
on corporate boards of directors. Slow, incremental progress in the area is
all that can reasonably be expected.
TREND—THE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS WILL INCREASE AS BUSINESSES SEE “IT MAKES GOOD
BUSINESS SENSE” TO IMPROVE THE GENDER DIVERSITY OF THEIR BOARDS.
Some who advocate increasing the gender diversity of corporate
boards claim that doing so will enhance corporate performance in two
respects. First, it will improve corporate governance. Second, it will
enhance bottom-line profitability of the business. Under this line of
reasoning, corporations will put more women on their boards of directors
simply out of self-interest. This conclusion assumes that managers will act
as rational maximizers of their corporation’s efficiency and profits, an
assumption that may or may not be true. Even assuming that corporate
managers do largely seek to enhance efficiency and profitability, the
problem with this conclusion is that the relationship between board gender
diversity and corporate governance and profitability has not been firmly
established.
There are theories and empirical studies that do indeed suggest that
increased gender diversity on the board is associated with improved
corporate governance and enhanced profitability.6 Those arguing for
increasing such diversity are quite fond of citing such theories and studies.7
However, other theories and studies show either no relationship between
gender diversity on the board and good corporate governance and enhanced
profitability, or even show a negative relationship between them.8
As Ms. Woryk, Professor Black, and other scholars have
recognized, the fairest assessment of the conflicting theories and studies is
that the evidence on whether a link exists between increased gender
diversity on boards of directors and improved corporate governance and

6
See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling in
the Gaps: Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or
Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809, 813–20 (2011); Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K.
Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? 5–6, 10–15 (Rock
Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 89, 2010).
7
See, e.g., Judy B. Rosener, Women on Corporate Boards Make Good Business Sense,
DIRECTORSHIP, May 2003, at 5 (citing study by Conference Board of Canada on female corporate board
members), available at http://www.womensmedia.com/lead/87-women-on-corporate-boards-makesgood-business-sense.html; Statement on Corporate Board Diversity, INTERORGANIZATION NETWORK,
http://www.ionwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/IONs-Policy-Statement-on-Corporate-BoardDiversity1.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
8
Dobbin & Jung, supra note 6, at 815–19; Rhode & Packel, supra note 6, at 8.
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enhanced profitability is inconclusive.9 Given the inconclusive nature of the
evidence, those disinclined to put women on boards of directors will not
likely be rushing to do so in search of better corporate governance and
higher profits.
TREND—THE CONFLUENCE OF AN INCREASING NUMBER OF WOMEN
MANAGERS AND A DEMOGRAPHIC LABOR SHORTAGE WILL FORCE FIRMS
TO PUT MORE WOMEN IN TOP POSITIONS AND ON THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS TO ATTRACT QUALIFIED WOMEN.
In her contribution, Ms. Woryk suggests that demographics and
competition for qualified managers will combine to increase the number of
women in boardrooms; she writes:
The emergence of well-educated and experienced women is
juxtaposed with an upcoming talent shortfall projected in
Europe by 2040, when a dearth of twenty-four million
skilled workers is forecast. The United States and Japan are
also facing flattening birth rates; hence, employers and
planners are already strategizing for optimization of the
skilled workforce. The aging of the workforce in developed
countries combined with the rise of rapidly developing
economies driving up demand for skilled professionals will,
by necessity, increase women’s access to the boardroom.10
Even if the demographic projections prove to be accurate, it does
not necessarily mean that we will see more women on corporate boards of
directors. First, as Professor Jayne Barnard points out, the size of boards in
publicly held companies has been decreasing.11 Thus, simply decreasing the
size of the board may be an alternative to the inclusion of more women.12
Second, and more importantly, while the pool of women managers
may continue to grow, social and cultural factors may limit the number of
women in the pool from which directors are typically drawn—top managers
and executives of corporations. In many corporations, reaching that pool
requires huge sacrifices of time and effort, sacrifices that may come at the
expense of family and other personal relationships. In our society, the
reality is that women still devote substantially more time and effort to
family care-giving than men, although the gap has narrowed in recent years.
That reality may render women unable or unwilling to make the sacrifices
necessary to jump into the directorial-candidate pool. The court’s opinion in
9

Woryk, supra note 3, at 25; Black, supra note 4, at 20; Rhode & Packel, supra note 6, at 15.
Woryk, supra note 3, at 36 (footnotes omitted).
Jayne W. Barnard, More Women on Corporate Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 703, 711–12 (2007).
12
Id. at 712.
10
11
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the recent case of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Bloomberg puts the situation rather bluntly:
Former General Electric CEO Jack Welch stated,
“There’s no such thing as work-life balance. There are
work-life choices, and you make them, and they have
consequences.” Looking at it purely from a career-or
compensation-focused point of view, Mr. Welch’s view
reflects the free-market employment system we embrace in
the United States, particularly for competitive, highly paid
managerial posts such as those at issue here . . . . The law
does not mandate “work-life balance.” It does not require
companies to ignore employees’ work-family tradeoffs and they are tradeoffs - when deciding about employee pay
and promotions . . . .
In a company like Bloomberg, which explicitly
makes all-out dedication its expectation, making a decision
that preferences family over work comes with
consequences. But those consequences occur for anyone
who takes significant time away from Bloomberg, not just
for pregnant women and mothers. To be sure, women need
to take leave to bear a child. And, perhaps unfortunately,
women tend to choose to attend to family obligations over
work obligations thereafter more often than men in our
society. Work-related consequences follow. Likewise, men
tend to choose work obligations over family obligations,
and family consequences follow. Whether one thinks those
consequences are intrinsically fair, whether one agrees with
the roles traditionally assumed by the different genders in
raising children in the United States, or whether one agrees
with the monetary value society places on working versus
childrearing is not at issue here.13
Perhaps the allocation of household and familial obligations
between men and women will continue to become more even. Perhaps
businesses will begin to believe that “all out dedication” retards business
efficiency and profitability. Even if these changes occur, they are likely to
occur extremely slowly; the demographic and labor-market-trends that Ms.
Woryk describes are not likely to increase the representation of women on
corporate boards of directors, except perhaps, in the very long run.

13

Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bloomberg L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 485–87 (S.D.N.Y.

2011).
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ACTION—NORWEGIAN-STYLE QUOTAS FOR THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN ON
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
Norway, Iceland, and other countries in Europe have adopted formal
quotas for gender diversity on corporate boards of directors.14 While such a
move would be efficacious in diversifying corporate boards of directors here
in the United States, it is a complete non-starter both politically and legally.
As Gregg Smith, Managing Director of Boyden Global Executive Search,
succinctly noted:
Culturally, quotas will not be successful in the United States
. . . . American culture is one where we see ourselves as
members of a meritocracy. We believe whole-heartedly
that anyone can grow up to be president. President Barrack
[sic] Obama’s election is proof positive to many that anyone
can get to the top, if they are prepared and work hard. The
other barrier to using quotas in America is the fact that
courts have not looked favorably on them, except as a
remedy for the most blatant forms of discrimination.15
ACTION—IMPROVE REQUIRED DISCLOSURES OF CORPORATE EFFORTS TO
ENHANCE GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS.
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted
a requirement that beginning on February 28, 2010, issuers subject to the
SEC’s proxy rules must disclose:
[H]ow, the nominating committee (or the board) considers
diversity in identifying nominees for director. If the
nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with
regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying
director nominees, describe how this policy is implemented,
as well as how the nominating committee (or the board)
assesses the effectiveness of its policy[.]16
The SEC’s rule does not define the term diversity.
As pointed out in both Professor Black’s and Professors Hazen and
Broome’s contributions to the present symposium, the results of the new
Professor Black, in
disclosure mandate have been disappointing.17
14
See Secretary-General of the European Comm’n, Commission Staff Working Paper - The Gender
Balance in Business Leadership 10–11 (March 3, 2011), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
pdf/en/11/st07/st07231.en11.pdf, for a description of the formal quotas adopted in various European
nations.
15
Gregg Smith, Could Gender Quotas Work in Corporate America?, BLACK ENTER. (May 25,
2010), http://www.blackenterprise.com/2010/05/25/could-gender-quotas-work-in-corporate-america/.
16
17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2011).
17
Black, supra note 4, at 14; Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome, Board Diversity and
Proxy Disclosure, 37 U. DAYTON. L. REV. 39, 74 (2011).
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surveying the disclosure of a limited number of Fortune 500 companies
(including ten with both female CEOs and 25% or more female director),
found that:
None of them stated that it had a formal policy on diversity.
Diversity was most commonly described as diversity of
backgrounds, skills, experiences, and perspectives.
Furthermore, several did not explicitly identify gender as a
factor of diversity. After personal attributes (integrity,
independence, etc.), business expertise was most frequently
identified as important.
The discussions about the
importance of diversity are even more abbreviated or
formulaic at companies with zero women directors, the
group of companies that we might hope would recognize
the need to change.18
The results put forth by Professors Hazen and Broome were
somewhat more encouraging, but still disappointing. For example, the
number of Fortune 100 proxy issuers mentioning gender in their proxy
materials involving the nomination of directors rose from nine to forty-one
after the effective date of the new rule.19 While this increase would seem to
represent substantial progress, it still leaves a majority of Fortune 100 proxy
issuers who do not even mention gender in discussing the consideration
given to diversity in selecting nominees for the board of directors.20
Of course, it may be too early to see any positive effect of the
current SEC diversity disclosure initiatives and impossible to predict the
impact of moves to strengthen those initiatives. Nonetheless, even if those
initiatives are clarified and strengthened, the end result may be a group of
reporting issuers who pay lip service to enhancing gender diversity on their
boards, but who make no real efforts to do so.21
ACTION—GET BOARDS OF DIRECTORS TO BROADEN THEIR CRITERIA FOR
SUITABLE CANDIDATES FOR THE BOARD.
One suggestion for increasing the number of women on corporate
boards is for boards to broaden their criteria for potential board nominees.
18

Black, supra note 4, at 15.
Hazen & Broome, supra note 17, at 69.
Id.
21
Indeed, one opponent of the SEC’s diversity initiative has suggested that firms simply resort to
boilerplate disclosures to meet the new rule. He writes:
At the end of the day, it would seem that boilerplate disclosure, such as “The
nominating committee of the Board takes into account the diversity of experience
of Board candidates, and determines how that experience will improve the
function of the Board,” would be sufficient to sidestep the burdens of this new
regulatory overreaching.
J.W. Verret, Diversity for Corporate Boards, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 23, 2009),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/12/23/diversity-for-corporate-boards/.
19
20
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Specifically, boards have traditionally looked upon former CEOs of major
corporations as the prime pool for board candidates.22 In recent years, the
pool has been broadened somewhat to include those with experience in other
top-level corporate managerial positions such as CFOs and CIOs.23 Even
that broadened pool is disproportionately male. Some of those who support
increasing the number of women on boards of directors urge directorialnominating committees to think outside the box by looking to candidates
who have achieved senior positions in law or accounting, or who serve on
the boards of not-for-profit corporations, or who have managerial
experience in government. Whether the attitudes and habits that make one a
top lawyer or accountant are useful in being a director of a corporation is an
open question. Whether the managerial skills developed in the government
or non-profit worlds are transferable to the world of for-profit corporations
is also an open question. Regardless of how these questions are ultimately
answered, getting corporate board members to broaden their lists of
potential candidates for membership away from the pool of top managers of
for-profit corporations will be very difficult.
The reason why it will be difficult to coax directors to look outside
the traditional nominee pool of top corporate managers is very simple—it
runs contrary to their self-interest. In a publicly-held corporation,
incumbent management generally dominates the board. Professor Donald
Langevoort describes the situation as follows: “[B]oards are dominated by
an inner circle of directors with a preference for the status quo and close
social and political ties to the CEO and the senior management team.”24 A
large majority of board members were themselves CEOs or members of the
senior-management team at various corporations.25 When selecting
nominees for new board members, the incumbent members of the board, as
well as the CEO and senior-management team, wish to select members with
whom they are comfortable. This does not just mean that they want new
members who look like them in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, etc.; they
want members who will understand what it is like to be in their position, and
be cognizant and understanding of the challenges they face. They want
someone who has walked a mile in their shoes, i.e., someone who was a
CEO or member of the senior-management team at a for-profit corporation.
Someone who has not had such experience may not understand why profit
targets have not been met, major plans have to be shelved, or why top
managers should get increases in compensation even if the corporation is not
doing well. While directors responsible for nominating new members to the
board may not be quite so consciously cynical or crass in their thinking, the
22

Rhode & Packel, supra note 6, at 15–16; Barnard, supra note 11, at 707.
Barnard, supra note 11, at 707.
Donald C. Langevoort, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling in the Gaps:
Commentary: Puzzles About Corporate Boards and Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 841, 848 (2011).
25
Barnard, supra note 11, at 707.
23
24
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need to appoint someone who understands their position is likely to
influence them strongly and keep them from looking outside the traditional
pool for corporate directors.
CONCLUSION
A person reading this essay might get the idea that none of the
aforementioned trends or plans will have any effect on getting more women
on to boards of directors, and that trying to do so is a fool’s errand. This is
not the case. I merely mean to suggest that, individually, these trends and
strategies will not have a dramatic short-term effect. Together with other
tactics and strategies they may, however, lead to a change in social attitudes.
They may cause directors to internalize the notion that society expects
women to play a significant role on the boards of corporations, and that a
strong case exists for increasing gender diversity on corporate boards based
on notions of fairness, justice, equity, and equal opportunity. We may reach
the point where a director will believe that it is just as embarrassing and
inappropriate for him to serve on an all-male corporate board as for a
politician to belong to a club that excludes women or minority members.
That is the goal, but as the title of this essay suggests, it is likely to take a
great deal of time and struggle to reach it.
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